Path: SAGT 2009 > Accepted Papers

Paphos - Cyprus

October 18 - 20, 2009

Supported by:
 

University of Cyprus

 
Integrated Project

IST-015964

European Association for Theoretical Computer Science

Limassol Co-operative Savings Bank Ltd

 Leah Epstein and Asaf Levin.

On equilibria for ADM minimization games

Shahar Dobzinski and Noam Nisan.

A Modular Approach to Roberts' Theorem

Andre Berger, Rudolf Müller and Seyed Hossein Naeemi.

Characterizing Incentive Compatibility for Convex Valuations

Clemens Thielen and Sven Krumke.

Truthful Mechanisms for Selfish Routing and Two-Parameter Agents

Michal Feldman and Moshe Tennenholtz.

Partition Equilibrium

Abraham Othman and Tuomas Sandholm.

Better with Byzantine: Manipulation-Optimal Mechanisms

Jose Correa and Nicolas Figueroa.

On the planner’s loss due to lack of information in Bayesian mechanism design

Krzysztof Apt and Arantza Estevez-Fernandez.

Sequential pivotal mechanisms for public project problems

Tobias Harks, Max Klimm and Rolf H. Moehring.

Characterizing the Existence of Potential Functions in Weighted Congestion Games

Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman and Noam Nisan.

 Free-Riding and Free-Labor in Combinatorial Agency

Yoram Bachrach, Edith Elkind, Reshef Meir, Dmitrii Pasechnik, Michael Zuckerman, Joerg Rothe and Jeffrey Rosenschein.

The Cost of Stability and Its Application to Weighted Voting Games

Kim Thang Nguyen and Christoph Dürr.

Non-Clairvoyant Scheduling Games

Hyunwoo Jung and Kyung-Yong Chwa.

The Balloon Popping Problem Revisited: Lower and Upper Bounds

Elliot Anshelevich, Sanmay Das and Yonatan Naamad.

Anarchy, Stability, and Utopia: Creating Better Matchings

Elliot Anshelevich and Satish Ukkusuri.

Equilibria in Dynamic Selfish Routing

Christine Chung and Evangelia Pyrga.

Stochastic Stability in Internet Router Congestion Games

Tanmoy Chakraborty and Sanjeev Khanna.

Nash Dynamics in Constant Player and Bounded Jump Congestion Games

Elliot Anshelevich and Bugra Caskurlu.

Price of Stability in Survivable Network Design

Andrew Byde, Maria Polukarov and Nicholas Jennings.

Games with Congestion-Averse Utilities

Oren Ben-Zwi, Ilan Newman and Guy Wolfovitz.

A Perfect Auction Derandomization

Felix Brandt, Markus Brill, Felix Fischer and Jan Hoffmann.

The Computational Complexity of Weak Saddles

Joshua Letchford, Vincent Conitzer and Kamesh Munagala.

Learning and Approximating the Optimal Strategy to Commit To

Martin Hoefer, Lars Olbrich and Alexander Skopalik.

Doing Good with Spam is Hard

Rajiv Raman, Khaled Elbassioni, Saurabh Ray and Rene Sitters.

On Profit-Maximizing Pricing for the Highway and Tollbooth Problems.

Felix Brandt, Markus Brill, Felix Fischer and Paul Harrenstein.

On the Complexity of Iterated Weak Dominance in Constant-Sum Games

Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski and Arkadii Slinko.

Swap Bribery

Vittorio Bilo', Angelo Fanelli, Michele Flammini and Luca Moscardelli.

Performances of One-Round Walks in Linear Congestion Games

Ronald Koch and Martin Skutella.

Nash Equilibria and the Price of Anarchy for Flows Over Time

Po-An Chen and David Kempe.

Bayesian Auctions with Friends and Foes